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Abstract   
Monetary incentives have been used worldwide to decrease high upfront costs of electric 
vehicles (EVs) and foster their adoption, but few empirical studies have analysed the 
effectiveness of such policies in Europe. The present thesis investigates the influence of 
consumer-side fiscal incentives on European EV adoption figures in 2010-2019 through a 
generalised method of moments (GMM) model. By exploiting the dynamic nature of the 
dependent variable, and controlling for socio-economic and attitudinal country-level data, I 
showed that the incentive design and the strength of network externalities in the country are 
critical determinants for the impact of monetary incentives. 
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1. Introduction 
The adoption of electric vehicles (EVs), as hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs), battery electric 
vehicles (BEVs) or plug-in-hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV), has in the past two decades been 
supported by public efforts from institutions over the globe. Despite their benefits in terms of 
fuel efficiency and lower emissions, electric vehicles still face adoption obstacles compared to 
standard internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs). On top of consumers concerns about 
driving range, vehicle reliability and disruptive technologies, widespread acceptance of EVs is 
hindered by their high upfront costs. Monetary incentives for consumers are hence seen as a 
critical determinant in reducing the reliance on fossil fuels of the transportation sector. 
Average EV registrations in Europe increased from 44 in 2010 to 17,542 in 2019, while 
mean consumer incentives went from EUR 2,733 in 2010 to EUR 5,975 in 2019. However, few 
papers have focused on historical data to empirically study the European market, and almost 
none of them performed an analysis of EV adoption patterns through a dynamic approach. The 
present research investigates the impact of monetary incentives on EVs adoption rates in Europe 
through a generalised method of moments (GMM) model. The model results are refined by 
controlling for socio-economic conditions, concerns for the environment, and the presence of 
network effects (both through the public charging infrastructure channel and through other 
channels emerging from the natural growth of technology adoption). The results of the study 
aim to integrate and support past findings on consumer incentives design, the magnitude of their 
impact, and the conditions influencing their effectiveness, as well as to suggest a more 
comprehensive approach to the issue allowed by the use of a dynamic model.  
This thesis is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the current literature 
on incentives efficiency in supporting electric vehicles; Section 3 outlines how the database 
was constructed; Section 4 serves as a preliminary analysis to ground the reasons for the 
database specification and methodology applied in the study (then presented in Section 5); and 
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Section 6 offers the main results of the study and compares them to the present literature. 
Finally, Section 7 concludes the study and outlines limitations and policy recommendations. 
 
2. Literature review  
Literature on the impact of incentives on EV adoption varies with respect to many 
dimensions. First, while most papers focus on (plug-in) hybrid electric vehicles, some more 
recent papers include battery electric vehicles too. Second, most analyses consider North 
American states or metropolitan cities, while seldom focus on cross-country analysis. Third, 
historical data studies differ in terms of methodology, with most papers relying on pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) or fixed-effects (FE) regressions. Finally, few studies specifically 
provide exact point estimates of the impact of incentives on vehicles adoption. 
One of the first analyses, conducted by Diamond (2009), found only weak impact of public 
incentives on annual US-states sales of three HEV car models between 2001 and 2009, but a 
strong impact of gasoline prices. The author claimed this is due to car producers internalising 
the final price reductions in their pricing schemes - a hypothesis then rebutted by Salle (2011). 
The robust relationship between EV sales and fuel prices was confirmed in Chandra et al. 
(2010), who also concluded that tax rebates in Canadian provinces between 1989 and 2006 
positively influenced HEV adoption. More specifically, HEV market share increased between 
34% and 42% per USD 1,000 depending on the province and vehicle class analysed. Gallagher 
and Muehlegger (2011) used quarterly US-sales of HEV vehicles between 2001 and 2006 to 
show that the impact of incentives varied based on their type or, more precisely, on consumer 
time-discounting of incentive savings. Indeed, while sales tax reductions, age, and income had 
a positive effect on HEV registrations (which increased up to 45% following a sales tax waiver 
of USD 1,000), income tax credits were shown to have no statistical effect. DeShazo et al. 
(2014) analysed the impact of a Californian plug-in rebate program of around USD 1,838 per 
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buyer and attribute to it 7% increase in BEV and PHEV market sales. Wee et al. (2018) used a 
dataset composed of bi-annual sales of EV vehicles in US states between 2010 and 2015, and 
found that a USD 1,000 increase in consumer subsidies led to a 5-10% increase in EV 
purchases, depending on the car model and state considered. Finally, Clinton and Steinberg 
(2019) took quarterly registration data of BEV in US states between 2011 and 2015 and applied 
to them different identification methods (FE regression and diff-in-diff with synthetic controls). 
The authors concluded that, while income tax credits had no impact on BEV registrations, a 
USD 1,000 increase in purchase rebates led to approximately 8% increase in registration 
figures. According to their analysis, direct financial incentives had a higher impact than 
charging stations availability, and private – not public – infrastructure positively correlated with 
BEV share (together with gender, education, and environmentalism). Other studies, not 
reported in depth for the sake of brevity, confirm the relationship between EV adoption and 
incentives (Beresteanu and Li 2011; Jin et al. 2014; Vergis and Chen 2014; Slowik and Lutsey 
2017). 
Outside North America, Sierzcula et al. (2014) analysed PEV market data from 30 
countries in 2012 and found that consumer financial incentives and per-capita charging stations 
led to higher purchases, although the estimates are small. Hall and Lutsey (2017) used 2016 
data from metropolitan areas in 14 countries and concluded that the availability of public 
charging stations and of consumer incentives were positively correlated with higher shares of 
adoption. Moreover, in most countries public charging stations supplemented – and did not 
replace – home and workplace charging. Similarly, Funke et al. (2019) reported an international 
comparison of literature on charging infrastructure. Since countries differ in terms of 
framework conditions (e.g. home ownership, share of detached houses and availability of home 
charging), there is no clear optimal amount of public stations. The authors concluded that a 
broad availability of home charging stations, and not necessarily of public infrastructure, is 
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sufficient at early stages of electrification, and of primary importance for further developments 
in mature markets (e.g. Norway). A lower share of detached houses is generally correlated with 
a higher share of public charging infrastructure. Hence, public infrastructure is an important 
substitute to home charging primarily in countries with low home charging opportunities, like 
the Netherlands.  
At the European level, most empirical studies consider Scandinavian countries, with few 
exceptions1. Aasness and Odeck (2015) focused on the Norwegian EV market between 2009 
and 2015 and conducted a study on incentives in place. Tax, toll and parking fee exemptions, 
as well as access to high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, effectively nudged Norwegian 
consumers into buying electric vehicles. Langbroek et al. (2016) used a stated-choice 
experiment, rather than an econometric approach, to analyse the impact of policy incentives on 
Swedish consumers. By taking into account indirect network incentives to EV adoption (such 
as parking and charging discounts, or HOV lanes availability) on top of monetary incentives, 
they concluded that price-sensitivity of consumers decreased as they entered more advanced 
stages of EV acceptance. In line with the Transtheoretical Model of Change developed by 
Prochaska (1991), behavioural change is a process dependent on the learning curve, and not an 
event. Accordingly, people in more mature stages of behavioural change are already 
considering buying an EV, and thus are less responsive to subsidies. Plötz et al. (2016) was the 
first study that analyzed national European PEV sales data, and it concluded that income, fuel 
prices, and both direct and indirect incentives had an impact on PEV sales between 2010 and 
2014. More specifically, a direct incentive of EUR 1,000 increased PEV sales share by about 
16%. Sprei (2013; 2018) analysed the sales of flex-fuel vehicles (FFVs) in Sweden from 2002 
to 2011, and focused, in particular, on the sharp drop in sales statistics after 2008. Their findings 
showed that lower gasoline prices and a change in the incentive policy after 2008 (from a point-
 
1 Studies on Norway, especially, should be analysed with caution given the country’s position as global leader in EV market 
share, with 46% of sales market share in 2018 (International Energy Agency 2019a). 
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of-sale rebate, to a smaller subsidy spread across the five years after purchase) were the most 
important determinants of the sales decrease. Finally, Münzel et al. (2019) used data similar to 
that of Plötz et al. (2016), but a more precise incentive modelling methodology, to analyse the 
impact of different incentives on 2010-2017 PHEV and BEV sales data. They find a 5-7% point 
estimate of incentives on EV share increase, which increases to 8% for rebates. They included 
a trend variable as an attempt to capture overall changes in technology diffusion, and found that 
it is significantly predicting future values of EV adoption rates. 
On top of monetary incentives, the literature confirms the key role of environmental 
attitudes of consumers. Clinton and Steinberg (2019) used the share of Green-Party registered 
voters as a proxy for community environmentalism, while Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) 
considered the per-capita Sierra Club membership rate. In their global analysis, Sierzcula et al. 
(2014) took into account the Environmental Performance Index from Yale University, and other 
studies (e.g. Li et al. 2017) included the share of commuters and the share of citizens that drive 
to work as proxies for environmental concern. In all previous cases, variables capturing 
environmentalism are positively correlated with EV adoption rate. Carley et al. (2013), Axsen 
et al. (2016), Nayum et al. (2016), and Priessner et al. (2018) built on the literature on cultural 
worldviews of Cherry et al. (2014) to analyse the attitudes of US, Canadian, Norwegian and 
Austrian representative EV buyers, respectively. The studies concluded that early EV buyers 
value low emissions and climate protection more than potential adopters or non-adopters, are 
more engaged in environment- and technology-oriented lifestyles, and concerned about 
dependency from foreign oil. For most studies, the inclusion of attitudinal variables reduces the 
predictive value of socio-economic factors. In other studies (e.g. Priessner et al. 2018) the 
former have an even stronger explanatory power than the latter. 
Most studies make use of OLS and FE regressions or stepwise regressions, while only few 
papers consider the dynamics of the dependent variable, the policy feedback loops, and the 
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possible endogeneity in OLS models by implementing Arellano and Bond estimators of GMM 
models. One of the first papers specifically accounting for network externalities is Jenn et al. 
(2013). This study analysed the increase in HEV vehicles in the US between 2000 and 2010, 
and modelled such increase by using the lagged dependent variable as an additional independent 
variable. Such methodology allowed to isolate the impact of exponential initial growth of EV 
technology and to avoid any overestimation of incentive effects. The studied policy, which 
provided income tax deductions of about USD 2,000 per buyer, was found to have increased 
HEV sales from 5% to 20%, depending on the car model considered. Such GMM estimates are 
however smaller than the estimates computed by the authors through a FE static model. Li et 
al. (2017) combined two theoretical models to study the effects of feedback loops on car 
purchases in 353 US metro-areas between 2010 and 2013. They estimated that income tax credit 
up to USD 7,500 had contributed to about 40% of EV sales, while network externalities through 
increases in charging stations amplified the policy shock, explaining 40% of that increase. 
Similarly, Springel (2017) studied the EV market in Norway between 2010 and 2015 and found 
a positive connection between car purchases and both consumer and charging station subsidies. 
Empirical data confirmed the positive relation between EV incentives and purchases, while a 
more structural approach corroborated the presence of network externalities of subsidies 
applied to both sides of the market. Jenn et al. (2018) studied PEV monthly registrations in the 
US between 2010 and 2015 and their relationship with individual tax credit and rebates. They 
found that applying a dynamic model reduces the estimates of rebates and other incentives 
compared to when using a static FE model. Overall, a USD 1,000 rebate leads to about 3% 
average increase in EV registrations, although different levels of consumer awareness on 
incentives can greatly increase the policy impact (up to 62% in California). The present analysis 
adds to this last group of studies using a dynamic methodology to assess the impact of public 
policy incentives and avoid possible overestimation.  
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3. Data structure  
The thesis is based on the database used in Münzel et al. (2019) (hereafter, “the authors”), 
with some additions. The panel data spans between 2010 and 2019 and it comprises 31 
countries: European Union countries (27), plus Island, Norway, Switzerland and the UK2. The 
dependent variable (evshare) is the share of the number of EV (BEV and PHEV) registrations 
(evregs) over the total number of vehicle registrations (carregs). The respective sources are the 
European Alternative Fuels Observatory (2020a) and Eurostat (2020a). Share variables, when 
used as dependent variables, should be logarithmically transformed to ensure normality of 
residuals, as advised by Wooldridge (2013). However, for observations with value of EV 
registrations equal to zero, the logarithm of the dependent variable is not defined. When the 
authors applied such transformation, then, they lost 30 observations out of the original 256, and 
ended up with an unbalanced dataset. On top of losing information, dropped observations are 
likely to be not randomly distributed3. Moreover, nine out of the dropped observations have 
non-zero values of fiscal incentives, i.e. the independent variable of interest. In order to 
circumvent these problems, I applied the following transformation to both the numerator of 
evshare (evregs) and its denominator (carregs). First, the following value 𝜀! is calculated for 
each country: 
 𝜀! = 0.001 ∗	max	(𝑒𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑠!,#) (1) 
where T is the year that registered the highest value of evregs in country i. Secondly, 𝜀! is added 
to all evregs and carregs values of country i across all the years of analysis. Lastly, the share of 
these two new variables is computed, which results in the transformed evshare4. No difference 
is introduced between the original and the transformed dependent variable for the same country 
 
2 Turkey has been excluded from the present analysis due to homogeneity reasons. Since the country never provided fiscal 
incentives throughout the period of analysis, its exclusion is not expected to change results dramatically. 
3 All of them belong to the 2010-2013 timespan, and mainly correspond to Eastern and Southern European countries. 
4 For instance, the maximum value of PEV registrations in Cyprus between 2010 and 2019 is 159. For all years, an epsilon 
equal to 0.159 is then added to evregs and carregs. 
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i and year t, since both the transformed denominator and numerator are increased by the same 
amount. Moreover: 
• As the following analysis takes into account within-country and not across-country 
variation, the transformation is not likely to bias results even though the added 𝜀! changes 
from country to country.  
• The largest within-country difference introduced is in the order of 1.11E-3 (corresponding 
to Iceland-2010)5. As such, the transformation introduced is considered to be small enough, 
even when accounting for the logarithmic form.  
• A visual analysis of the transformed evshare confirms that largest original-to-transformed 
evshare differences correspond to observations in 2010 and 2011. These years also present 
values of monetary incentives which are mostly zero or small relative to the level of 
incentives in the following years.  
Even with the transformation, then, estimates of the impact of fiscal incentives on EV 
registrations can be considered to be conservative. Such hypothesis is confirmed when 
confronting reduced database models present in Table 2 (based on the transformed evshare) 
with models in Appendix Table 1 (based on the original evshare). Overall, estimates based on 
the original dependent variable are inflated compared to those based on the transformed one, 
and this holds for all model specifications considered. The transformation is therefore effective 
in avoiding data loss, while at the same time it seems not to bias the estimates upwards. 
The independent variable of interest is the volume of total incentives towards BEVs and 
PHEVs (monetaryincenitve). The final variable is given by the sum of six types of incentives: 
company car tax and circulation tax (i.e. recurring incentives); rebates, VAT deductions and 
other point-of-sale tax incentives (i.e. one-time incentives upon purchase of the vehicle); 
income tax deductions (i.e. one-time incentives after purchase of the vehicle). The calculation 
 
5 The second-larger one is in the order of 6.82E-4 (corresponding to Iceland-2011). For those two years, Iceland had no fiscal 
incentives, so one can assume the transformation does not influence the estimates of the monetary incentives. 
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of such incentives is based on yearly reports of the European Automobiles Manufacturers 
Association (ACEA 2010-2019) and follows the procedure outlined in Münzel et al. (2019). 
The procedure takes into account the average BEV and average PHEV tax payments vis-à-vis 
taxes corresponding to comparable ICEV models to compute the most accurate values of EV 
incentive savings (see Appendix A).  
After adding socio-economic controls, I then expanded the original database from the 
authors by including attitudinal controls. The sources of database variables and their respective 
summary statistics are presented in Table 1 and in Appendix Table 2. In order to limit the 
number of variables introduced in the model, electricity price and diesel price are from now on 
combined into a single variable as the “ratio of electricity price over diesel price”, i.e. the energy 
ratio (present in Table 1 only through its two components)6. Following the literature on the 
impact of environmental attitudes on EV adoption, I included two environmental variables: The 
Environmental Performance Index (EPI) from the Yale University Centre for Environmental 
Law & Policy (2010-2019), and the share of citizens that are pro-environmental incentives that 
is derived from the Eurobarometer Special surveys on “Attitudes of European Citizens Towards 
the Environment” (European Commission 2011, 2014, 2017, 2019a). The EPI provides yearly 
data on country-based ranking on environmental health and ecosystem vitality. It represents an 
overview of how close countries are to established environmental policy targets7. The second 
variable, instead, captures the share of citizens seeing fiscal incentives as an effective way to 
tackle environmental problems. The share of pro-incentive citizens reflects the percentage of 
respondents that agree that “Ensuring higher financial incentives (e.g., tax breaks, subsidies) to 
industry, business and citizens who protect the environment” is one of the most effective ways 
of tackling environmental problems. The variable presents three missing non-EU countries 
 
6 As the correlation between diesel and gasoline prices is high (above 0.80), diesel price only, and not gasoline price, is used 
to compute the energy ratio. 
7 As electric vehicles adoption is not directly included as composite of the index, possible simultaneity between the index and 
the dependent variable is excluded. 
 11 
(Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), and is not continuous over the years of analysis8. Hence, 
the information provided on environmental attitudes is considered to be inferior when compared 
to that captured by the Environmental Performance Index.  
Table 1: List and sources of variables 
 
To sum up, the database used in this thesis is based on the one provided by Münzel et al., 
(2019), with the following changes. First, the period of analysis was expanded to include 2018 
and 2019. Second, Turkey has been excluded for homogeneity and data availability reasons. 
Third, the dependent variable is now transformed, as outlined above, and balanced. Fourth, the 
database includes two variables controlling for environmental attitudes. Finally, the variable for 
monetary incentives in Estonia now includes positive incentives between 2012 and 2014. 
According to different sources (European Environment Agency 2016; International Energy 
Agency 2019b; Gerdes 2013), the Estonian government offered rebates equivalent to half of 
 
8 Moreover, pre-EU values for Croatia are missing, since the country entered the Union in 2014 only. 
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the price of the vehicle (up to EUR 18,000) between 2012 and 2014. These rebates were 
overlooked by the authors. Appendix Figure 1 presents the evolution of monetary incentives 
and EV shares in Estonia. The dependent variable, indeed, displays a spike in the years 
corresponding to the policy. 
 
4. Preliminary analyses: FE model and database considerations 
A graphical analysis of Figure 1 suggests the presence of a positive trend pattern in the 
dependent variable. Moreover, when performing a simple OLS regression of the share of 
electric vehicle on only a time trend variable, in 30 out of 31 countries the trend variable is 
statistically significant9. Estonia is the only country where the trend is not significant, as also 
suggested by Appendix Figure 1. With respect to the monetary incentive variable, values of 
incentives are generally higher for Northern countries, but the variable does not display a clear 
upward trend (Appendix Figure 2). As expected, both monetary incentives and public charging 
stations are positively correlated with the share of EV adoption (the correlation coefficients are 
0.49 and 0.39, respectively)10. 
As part of a preliminary analysis, I tested the presence of policy selection on the level of 
incentives. Endogenous policy application might make it difficult to interpret results, as values 
of monetary incentives might be affected by the dependent variable. A probit model (with a 
dummy for the presence of monetary incentives as dependent variable) and a FE model (with 
the continuous variable of monetary incentives as dependent variable) are presented in 
Appendix Table 3. Particular attention needs to be taken when modelling the share of EV in 
such models. Fiscal policies are usually discussed months before implementation and enter in 
force from the year following the policy debate. Hence, in presence of policy selection based  
 
9 Following Münzel et al. (2019), the trend variable is given by the natural logarithmic form of each year. For instance, for 
values in year 2010 the variable trend takes a value of “ln(2010)”. 
10 The two independent variables are also positively correlated with each other (correlation coefficient of 0.25).  
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Figure 1: Share of electric vehicles (BEV and PHEV) registrations by region (log) 
 
on EV share levels, one would expect EV registrations of the previous year to have an impact 
on the decision of policymakers to introduce incentives from the following year on. Hence, I 
included a one-period lagged value of EV share as independent variable in the regressions. The 
results show that the only significant variable in the models is the number of charging stations 
(both lagged one year and not). Other lagged variables have been included but are not 
significant. Overall, then, there is no evidence of this type of endogeneity. 
As mentioned in the previous section, Münzel et al. (2019) move from a balanced database 
to an unbalanced (hereafter, “reduced”) dataset when they apply the logarithmic transformation 
to the dependent variable. The transformation, however, is likely to change the database non-
randomly. To understand what characteristics are decisive in defining which countries have a 
zero value of EV registrations, I run a probit model on a dummy variable with value of 1 when 
the country exhibits positive values of EV share, and 0 otherwise (see Appendix Table 4). As 
expected, monetary incentives predict the presence of electric vehicle registrations11. Moreover, 
 
11  Charging stations are omitted from the regression because positive values of the variable predict success perfectly. 
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observations with zero EV registrations differ in six other characteristics from observations 
with positive values of the dependent variable: unemployment, education, car stock, population 
density, km of motorways and environmental performance. This confirms that the exclusion of 
observations with zero registrations is not random, and that the use of a transformed dependent 
variable to avoid information loss is justified. 
To further understand how a different transformation of the dependent variable implies 
different results, I replicated what was previously done by the authors. Changes in my model, 
compared to what was done by the authors, include the addition of the charging stations variable 
and the transformed dependent variable (see Section 3 for a more complete list of changes in 
the database). In line with Münzel et al. (2019), the country fixed-effects model includes a trend 
variable, the monetary incentive variable, and the energy ratio. To this base model, I then add 
the lagged variable of charging stations stock as further control. As done by Clinton and 
Steinberg (2019), such variable needs to be included in order to reduce possible omitted variable 
bias, but it needs to be lagged to avoid the introduction of simultaneity. While it is less likely 
to introduce simultaneity in the model through the variable capturing fiscal incentives (since 
the level of incentives is decided in the previous years), current increases in the demand for 
charging stations might be the result of current increases in EV registrations. This type of 
simultaneity might affect the consistency of estimates. A modified Wald statistic for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity test and a Jochmans Portmanteau test for within-group correlation exhibit 
signs of heteroskedasticity and first order within-groups serial correlation. Standard errors are 
hence clustered at the country level. The model is then applied on different database 
specifications and with the exclusion or inclusion of public charging stations. 
Table 2 confirms that monetary incentive estimates are sensitive to the database considered. 
However, with or without the inclusion of charging stations, and with or without the inclusion 
of Estonia, estimates of the monetary incentive variable are higher when the reduced database 
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Table 2: Country fixed-effects models 
 
is considered. Moreover, the presence of a year trend in the dependent variable pattern is 
confirmed. While the results for monetary incentive and for the energy ratio are in line with 
what is expected from the literature, the direction and significance of the lagged charging 
stations variable is surprising. Although it is not clear why this is the case, the analysis in 
Appendix B on the impact of charging stations on the dependent variable provides evidence 
that the time specifications under the static FE model (i.e. through the use of a year trend 
variable or of year dummies) might not be the optimal model choice for this relationship. 
The preliminary analysis confirmed the absence of policy selection between the dependent 
variable and the monetary incentive variable. Moreover, database specifications are shown to 
greatly change incentive coefficients. With the use of an unbalanced dataset and a linear model, 
it is difficult to isolate the true historical impact of incentives. Indeed, the estimation of 
incentive coefficients needs to be purged from two biases:  
• The bias stemming from positive network externalities. In the absence of a model that 
accounts for the time persistency of EV registrations (i.e. the “natural growth” of the 
technology adoption curve and the network externalities besides public charging stations), 
the estimates of monetary incentives might be inflated. 
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• The bias stemming from underlying country characteristics. The unbalanced database 
might mask differences in countries that adopted electric vehicles earlier or later on in the 
decade. Such differences might then wrongly be attributed to the level of incentives 
available, rather than to other country characteristics.  
By using a balanced dataset, which by definition gives the same weight to all countries, the 
impact of the second bias is reduced, and the impact of incentives can be better isolated. Further, 
a dynamic model takes into account the impact of network externalities on levels of EV 
registrations by allowing for the baseline level of registrations (from which following adoption 
rate growth occurs) to change over time. Additionally, this methodology copes with possible 
endogeneity between the dependent variable and the charging infrastructure, as well as 
ultimately avoids the overestimation of incentive coefficients. 
 
5. Final Methodology: GMM on Balanced Dataset 
According to Roodman (2009), a GMM dynamic model can be applied if: (1) the process 
of the dependent variable is dynamic, with current levels influenced by past levels; (2) some 
regressors, such as public charging stations, might be endogenous or predetermined, meaning 
that current disturbances are influenced by past values; (3) the panel is short; (4) the 
idiosyncratic disturbances suffer from heteroskedasticity and serial correlation; (5) such 
disturbances are uncorrelated across individuals. While the previous section gave evidence of 
the possible predetermined nature of the charging stations variable, the present and following 
sections further support the hypothesis of the dynamic nature of the dependent variable. Out of 
the remaining conditions to use GMM models12, the last assumption is the one that requires 
more caution, and it is more likely to be satisfied if time-varying factors are included as 
regressors. 
 
12 The short panel structure (i.e. N>T) has been discussed in section 3, and evidence of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation has been found when studying the FE model in Section 4. 
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As outlined in Bond (2002), pooled OLS estimates of a model including the lagged 
dependent variable present an upward bias, while within-group FE estimates present a 
downward bias in short panels (Nickell, 1981). Hence, pooled OLS and FE models are expected 
to provide the upper and lower bound estimates for GMM consistent estimators. If difference-
GMM estimators are close to FE estimators, one has evidence of Nickell bias and weak 
instrumentation being present. System-GMM should in that case be preferred13. Since 
difference-GMM estimates for the dependent variable have a coefficient around 0.38 and thus 
similar to the one provided by the FE model (see Appendix Table 5), system-GMM models are 
to be preferred in this case. Moreover, the significance of the lagged dependent variable 
confirms the dynamic time structure of the data, which was instead modelled through a FE 
regression with year trend by Münzel et al. (2019). The general GMM model takes the 
following form: 
 (2) 
where t is the year and i is the country considered. The model uses as internal instruments the 
1-4 lags of the monetary incentive and energy ratio variables, and the 2-4 lags of the dependent 
and charging stations variables14. As the validity of instruments in system GMM depends on 
the assumption that they are uncorrelated with unobserved country-fixed effects, the use of time 
controls (and their inclusion as external instruments) is highly recommended (Roodman 2009). 
However, when running the GMM models with time trend and performing a Pesaran CD test, 
the hypothesis of cross-section independence, essential for consistent GMM estimates, is not 
satisfied. The hypothesis is instead confirmed when including year dummies in the model (d$), 
and also as external instruments. Indeed, as dummies are assumed to be orthogonal to country-
fixed effects, their inclusion ensures that the fifth assumption described above is satisfied. 
 
13 Moreover, system-GMM is suggested if T is short and the dependent variable is persistent (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
14 The first lags of the dependent variable and of charging stations are not included as instruments due to the dynamic nature 
of the former and the predetermined nature of the latter. 
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As suggested by Roodman (2009), all controls entering the basic model are included as 
instruments as well, and instruments are collapsed to avoid overidentification. In models with 
additional controls, such variables are also included as instruments only conditional on models 
not suffering from weak instrumentations given by too many instruments. Moreover, as the data 
presents panel groupwise heteroskedasticity, standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
In presence of heteroskedasticity the Sargan test is unreliable, hence only p-values of the 
Hansen test are reported in the following section. Finally, a Ramsey RESET test for 
misspecification of the linear model is performed and the hypothesis of misspecification is 
rejected. The current model is correctly specified as linear. 
With few exceptions, models in the next section are trustworthy. In the Arellano-Bond tests 
for AR(1), the null-hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation is rejected. Moreover, in the 
AR(2) tests, the null-hypothesis of no second-order correlation in disturbances is never rejected. 
In all models, the number of instruments is lower than the number of groups, and the p-values 
of the Hansen tests are well above 0.10 but not suspiciously high15. Overall, the dynamic models 
are correctly capturing the persistency in EV registrations (i.e. the lagged dependent variable is 
always statistically significant) and the values of the lagged dependent variable lie within the 
expected upper and lower bounds presented in Appendix Table 5. 
 
6. Results and sensitivity analyses 
Table 3 reports results for GMM estimates of monetary incentives across different 
specifications. Overall, Model 4 is chosen for its completeness in control variables, number of 
observations, and values on the post-estimation tests (Arellano-Bond and Hansen tests). The 
other models in Table 3 are to be interpreted as sensitivity analyses to better study monetary 
incentive estimates, and are sorted in this manner for the sake of consistency with Table 216.  
 
15 High p-values in the Hansen test could instead be a sign of overidentification and weak instrumentation (Roodman 2009).   
16 The considerations done in the present section also hold when analysing models excluding Estonia (Appendix Table 6).   
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Table 3: Basic GMM regressions 
 
In all models, estimates of the lagged dependent variable are highly significant, and 
incentive estimates for the respective models are lower than under the FE specifications in Table 
2 (in line with Jenn et al. 2013, Li et al. 2017, Jenn et al. 2018). Compared to Table 2, where 
the inclusion of the charging stations variable greatly increases incentives estimates (from 9.3% 
to 12.6%), GMM estimates after the inclusion of charging stations vary less (from 8.9% to 
9.7%). Although never significant, charging stations estimates are positive in the GMM 
regressions (differently from FE models). The inclusion of the EPI variable in the baseline 
GMM model increases the estimates (Table 3, Column 1 vis-a-vis Column 2), possibly due to 
a reduction in omitted variable bias. However, such addition decreases the estimates compared 
to the charging stations model (Table 3, Column 3 vis-a-vis Column 4), as previously found in 
the literature (e.g. Clinton and Steinberg 2019). The inclusion of the share of pro-incentive 
citizens variable in Model 5 leads to similar estimates. Models 6 and 7 including the 
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components of charging station infrastructure, i.e. fast and slow public chargers, suggest similar 
incentive coefficients than the ones found in models with the total level of charging stations. 
Moreover, Model 4 estimates are also consistent to the inclusion of socio-economic variables 
(see Appendix Table 7), with estimates ranging from 7.7% to 12.2%. Overall, a EUR 1,000 
increase in monetary incentives accounted on average for about 8-9% increase in European 
2010-2019 EV registration shares. 
The impact of monetary incentives can be split into one-time and recurring incentives. In 
line with previous literature (Gallagher and Muehlegger 2011, Sprei 2018, Münzel et al. 2019, 
Clinton and Steinberg 2019), Appendix Table 8 confirms that the most salient incentives are 
the ones which most affect consumer choices, i.e. one-time purchase incentives (and, more 
specifically, incentives at purchase), rather than future income tax or recurrent incentives. When 
further splitting the purchase incentive variable in its most basic elements (Table 4), rebates is 
the only component which is statistically significant. The model in Column 1 of Table 4 needs 
to be taken with caution, since the high p-value of the Hansen test could be a sign of weak 
instrumentation. Instead, Models 2-4 confirm the consumer-discounting hypothesis first 
theorised by Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011): rebates, being the most immediate, direct and 
salient out of all fiscal policies, are the incentives that most impact consumer choices. 
Moreover, rebate estimates of 9.1% and their level of significance are similar to what was found 
in the models of Table 3 considering the full monetary incentive variable. Finally, public 
charging stations are shown to have a slightly positive impact on EV shares.  
To better analyse the relationship between feedback loops and incentives, I sectioned the 
database by lower and upper halves of EV registration shares17. In the following GMM models, 
the level of EV registration shares is to be interpreted as a proxy for the natural growth in the 
technology adoption and for the feedback loops in terms of all other positive network externali- 
 
17 The bottom section also contains the 28 observations with zero EV registrations. The mean value of positive EV shares 
used as a threshold is 0.019, dividing the sections into 132 and 145 observations respectively. 
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Table 4: Components of purchase incentives 
 
ties that lie outside the channel of public charging infrastructure (that the model actively takes 
into account) - e.g. behavioural acceptance of EV cars, increased availability and saliency of 
new EV car models, indirect incentives such as HOV lanes. The upper half of the database 
contains observations in countries and years where network externalities are assumed to be 
stronger. A first analysis of the two different sections is provided in Table 5. Column 1 presents 
results for the lower section, i.e. for observations with lower network externalities, and has 
indeed a lower estimate for the lagged value of the dependent variable compared to the upper 
section columns. Column 2 displays results for the upper section model, which, apart from 
presenting higher persistency in the lagged dependent variable, shows signs of possible second-
order correlation due to the higher persistency of the dependent variable (p-value of 0.106 for 
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AR(2)). Since this could lead to inconsistent estimates, a model including also a two-period 
lagged dependent variable is run. The resulting model (Column 3) presents improved p-values 
of the Arellano-Bond and Hansen tests.  
Table 5: Interaction between network externalities and incentives, by data sectioning 
 
Although the number of observations in the upper and bottom section is similar, further 
caution needs to be taken to exclude the possibility of introducing selection bias when 
sectioning the database. Recalling what was discussed in Section 4, observations with positive 
EV registrations differ from those with zero EV registrations with respect to at least seven 
variables. Caution needs now to be taken to ensure that observations in the highest and lowest 
halves of EV shares do not statistically correspond to countries with different characteristics. 
To avoid that eventuality, a probit model is run (Appendix Table 9). The dependent variable is 
0 for observations with values lower than the mean value of EV share (0.019 threshold), and 1 
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for the observations above the threshold. The results suggest that observations differ only in 
terms of the unemployment level and, as expected, by the incentives amount. Therefore, in 
order to avoid selection bias and have reliable estimates, the previous models on upper and 
lower sections of Columns 1 and 3 are run again after controlling for the level of unemployment.  
Even when controlling for this possible cause of selection bias, monetary incentive 
estimates are significant at both levels of network externalities. Although in all models incentive 
estimates are positive and significant, when analysing the upper section the estimates slightly 
decrease (Table 5 Column 1 vis-a-vis Column 3; Column 4 vis-a-vis Column 5). The incentive 
coefficients are lower when network externalities are established and stronger, possibly due to 
the fact that the price-sensitivity of consumers decreases as markets advance in the process of 
behavioural change (Langbroek et al. 2016). While for the lower section in Column 1 
environmental attitudes positively predict EV adoption rates, when controlling for the 
unemployment level in Model 4 such impact loses its significance, supporting the hypothesis 
that socio-economic conditions are critical at first stages of electrification. In turn, a higher 
unemployment level is associated with lower EV registration shares for observations where 
network externalities - other than public charging infrastructures - are weaker.  
Results by monetary incentive composition in Appendix Table 10 are in line with what was 
discussed until now. Indeed, rebates are the only type of incentives for which estimates are 
consistently positive and significant, and estimates of incentives decrease with higher levels of 
network externalities. A similar analysis between upper and lower levels of feedback loops is 
performed by sectioning years in the database before and after 2014 (see Appendix Table 11). 
As suggested also in Jenn et al. (2013), both the natural growth of EV technology adoption and 
indirect positive network externalities are assumed to progressively increase as time passes. 
Again, results show higher values of monetary incentive estimates in the first years of analysis. 
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7. Discussion and conclusion 
Most empirical studies on the fiscal incentives towards EV adoption focus on the 
identification of policies to which consumers react the most, and on the description of what are 
the characteristics of the marginal consumer reactive to such policies. This research combined 
the analysis of past EV registration patterns with European socio-economic and attitudinal 
country-level data, while controlling for network externalities (in terms of public charging 
infrastructure or not) and the natural growth of the EV technology through the use of a dynamic 
model. The identification of such model has been a central piece of the study. Departing from 
the data structure of Münzel et al. (2019), this research applied a transformation to the 
dependent variable EV share and added attitudinal controls and public charging infrastructure 
to the model of the authors. Compared to Münzel et al. (2019), the impact of incentives is here 
decoupled from the bias coming from using an unbalanced dataset. Additionally, compared to 
previous studies at the European level, the influence of fiscal policies is also purged from the 
upwards bias in FE estimates stemming from not accounting for positive network externalities.  
The present study revealed that, when using a FE static model, incentive estimates are more 
subject to changes in the database and are not correctly accounting for the natural growth in 
technology adoption. Instead, by exploiting the dynamic nature of the dependent variable, 
GMM models presented in this research provide more stable and smaller point estimates, since 
they allow to better account for the possible endogeneity in predetermined regressors (e.g. 
charging stations) and for the natural growth in the technology adoption curve. Overall, and in 
line with previous studies (Jenn et al. 2013, Plötz et al. 2016, Wee et al. 2018, Clinton and 
Steinberg 2019), a EUR 1,000 increase in consumer fiscal incentives accounted on average for 
about 8-9% increase in European 2010-2019 EV market share in terms of car registrations. 
This research found that concern for environmental protection from policymakers and 
society is significant in predicting initial levels of EV registrations, but its impact is less critical 
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than that of socio-economic factors, such as the level of unemployment. Secondly, public 
charging infrastructure is not consistently linked to higher EV registrations. In line with 
previous literature (Hall and Lutsey 2017, Clinton and Steinberg 2019, Funke et al. 2019), it 
might be the case that private infrastructure, but not necessarily public charging, is associated 
with higher rates of adoption. Unfortunately, such data are unavailable in the database 
constructed. The lack of information on private charging stations, on local or regional 
incentives, and on more indirect incentives apart from public charging infrastructure (HOV lane 
accessibility, home-charging subsidies, parking fee exemptions etc.) are some of the limitations 
of the present study. Even more decisive to provide further insights on the patterns of EV 
adoption would be a higher data granularity, in terms of more years of analysis, regional 
distinction between urban and rural sales, and the availability of EV sales data by vehicle model.  
Network infrastructures besides public charging stations are significant in determining 
successive EV adoption rates and have a slightly offsetting effect on the impact of monetary 
incentives, as also illustrated by Langbroek et al. (2016). Indeed, when a country already 
presents above-average levels of EV registrations, the impact of monetary incentives is less 
critical to increasing EV adoption even further, ceteris paribus. Policymakers are then suggested 
to first understand where national consumers stand in the process of EV adoption, and only then 
adapt the magnitude and type of the monetary incentive policy to be introduced. Additionally, 
incentive design is significant in predicting policy effectiveness in shaping consumer decisions 
(as previously presented by Gallagher and Muehlegger 2011, Sprei 2018, Münzel et al. 2019, 
Clinton and Steinberg 2019). Fiscal incentives, especially in their most salient and direct form 
of rebates, are critical at initial stages of EV transition and maintain a positive influence on 
registrations even at further stages of electrification. Empirically, rebates are proven to be the 
EV fiscal policy to which consumers have reacted the most, and thus represent the incentive 
design that most certainly boosts the process of transition to electrical mobility. 
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Appendix Figure 2: Monetary incentives by region (thousands, Euro) 
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Appendix Table 5: Upper and lower bonds of lagged dependent variable estimates 
 
 





























































Appendix Table 10: Interaction between network externalities and incentive 












































Appendix A: Modelling of the variable on monetary incentives 
The procedure to derive the variable monetaryincentive follows five steps, as outlined in 
Münzel et al. (2019).  
First of all, the market share of BEV and PHEV models throughout the period of analysis 
is considered. Between 2010 and 2019, the most sold BEV model was Nissan Leaf (154,675 
units)18, while the most sold PHEV model was Mitsubishi Outlander PHEV (158,330 units) 
(European Commission 2018; Cars Sales Base 2019). The prices and car specifications of these 
two car models are used as benchmarks for BEV and PHEV cars, respectively. Secondly, the 
two models are paired with two comparable internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) in 
terms of price, characteristics and market share: VW Golf and VW Tiguan. Thirdly, European 
Commission Car Price Indexes between 2005 and 2011 (EC 2005; EC 2006; EC 2007; EC 
2008; EC 2009; EC 2010; EC 2011) are used as benchmarks to compute country-based mean 
car price indexes for VW Golf. Using German car models mean prices between 2010 and 2019 
as numeraire, and the computed mean VW Golf country price indexes, country-mean prices by 
model are determined. Four mean prices, one for each model, are then computed for each 
country. Fourthly, taxes and incentives given in ACEA Tax Reports are derived for the 
corresponding four types of models, and the average incentives by electric vehicle model are 
computed: taxes corresponding to the registration of a Nissan Leaf are compared to taxes 
corresponding to the registration of a VW Golf, resulting in the BEV mean incentive; the same 
is done between Mitsubishi Outlander PHEV and VW Tiguan, resulting in the PHEV mean 
incentive. Lastly, the two mean incentives (BEV and PHEV) are averaged to yield the final 
average incentive for EV registration.  
 
18 Although the most sold BEV car in the period analyzed was actually the Renault Zoe (173,250 units), its availability began 
in 2013 only. For the sake of consistency in price availability, then, Nissan Leaf is used as benchmark BEV model, since its 
commercialization started in 2010. 
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This fourth step is repeated for each of the six components of monetary incentives: rebates, 
point-of-sale taxes, VAT deduction (i.e. purchase incentives); income tax deductions (i.e. one-
time incentives); company car tax, and circulation tax (i.e. recurring incentives). The value of 
the monetary incentive variable is then the sum of these six elements. 
 
Appendix B: Analysis of the impact of charging stations within a fixed-effects model 
For all FE models of Table 3 that include the variable for the level of charging stations two 
considerations can be made. First of all, the inclusion of charging stations increases the value 
of the monetary incentive estimate. This would be the case if in models 1-4 of Table 3 an 
omitted variable bias would be present. However, since charging stations, monetary incentive 
and EV registrations are all positively correlated (see page 12), one would expect the bias in 
models 1-4 to be positive, and not negative. Secondly, charging stations are statistically 
significant, but one would expect their estimates to be positive, and not negative.  
Both elements are not in line with what expected, and suggest that the specifications of the 
model might not be correct. To understand what might be causing these results, I run different 
FE regressions on the full database, with and without the time trend. In all specifications, when 
the time trend is included the direction of charging stations changes and is not in line with what 
literature would suggest. The same results are found when using other database specifications 
(lagged charging stations; lagged charging stations and additional controls), when using a log 
version of charging stations, and also when dividing the variable in its two components (fast 
chargers and slow chargers). Finally, the inclusion of time dummies, instead of a time trend, 
does not change the significance and direction of the variable.  
As all models which include a trend present significant but negative estimates of charging 
stations, the results suggest that the time specifications of the static linear model might be 
obscuring the expected impact of charging stations. 
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Appendix B Table 1: Analysis of charging stations in a FE model 
 
 
 
